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1 Introduction 
Casual inspection of the Post Keynesian literature, like other heterodox literatures, 
reveals an extent of reference to historical texts and analysis of these texts which is 
unusual in modern economics. The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of 
the part that history of thought plays in Post Keynesian economics, and how history of 
thought is understood within the school. It will be argued that this understanding does 
not allow for history of thought to be fitted into dualistic categories, or indeed to be 
separated off from economics itself. While some have raised issue with Post 
Keynesian history of thought by means of this attempt at posing distinctions, we will 
explore here how the Post Keynesian approach to history of thought takes issue with 
the distinctions themselves. 
The discussion therefore begins with a general account of the background of 
historiographical discussion, bearing in mind the way in which the heterodox 
economists’ use of history of thought is viewed by others. An account is then offered 
of the organic way in which history of thought is embedded in Post Keynesian 
economics, looking first at the founding fathers, and then the developing school of 
Post Keynesians. This account will refer more to the type of use made of, and 
contribution to, the history of thought, than to the specific content of the relevant 
history of thought.i The paper then considers Post Keynesian history fo thought in 
terms of current categories: how far Post Keynesians draw on history of economic 
analysis as something distinct from ‘pure history’, and the relationship between 
 1 
history of thought and methodology/Methodology in Post Keynesianism. Finally the 
paper considers the future role of history of thought from the point of view of 
developing and promoting a particular approach to economics.  
 
2 The Role and Nature of History of Thought in Post Keynesian Economics 
We consider here two sets of categories in the historiography literature which have 
been used to characterise Post Keynesian economics in relation to the history of 
thought. The first refers to how far history of economic thought conforms to ‘proper’ 
history, and the second to the relationship between history of thought and 
methodology. 
Discussion of history of thought has at times focused on two categories: 
intellectual history (IH) and the history of economic analysis (HEA) (see Waterman, 
1998, Coats, 2000). The former, according to Waterman, represents ‘an attempt to 
discover some features of the past as it really was’, while the latter is designed to 
‘trace the lines of descent to leading analytical themes in economics and to study 
intellectual connections between the different lines’, or doctrinal history (Waterman, 
1998, 304). One way of putting the distinction is that IH offers a historical 
reconstruction, while HEA offers a rational reconstruction (Blaug, 1990; Winch, 
1998, 355).ii Waterman argued that each form of history has value for economists, and 
that each can inform the other.  
It has been argued by some that history of thought within a heterodox school 
of thought inevitably falls into the category of HEA. Further, it has been argued that 
history of economic thought should instead aspire to construct their history as 
historians do, that is, IH. The argument to be developed here is rather that Post 
Keynesian history of thought does not fit readily into either category.  While history 
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of thought is pursued primarily to inform modern economics (and thus is not IH), this 
goal is seen as being best served by building up a historian’s understanding of older 
texts (and thus not HEA). While it may be argued that some of this is done well and 
some badly, like anything else, the point to be developed here is that Post Keynesian 
history of thought does not allow for a separation between history and economics in 
the manner entailed by the IH/HEA distinction.iii It consists of a looking backward in 
order to look forward.iv  
The Post Keynesian approach to history has a long pedigree. It can be found 
for example in the Scottish education tradition (which formed the likes of Hutcheson, 
Hume, Smith and Steuart). What we would nowadays call transferable analytical 
skills were conveyed to students by a historical method of teaching – teaching 
mathematics, for example by teaching the different forms of mathematical thought as 
they emerged in different historical contexts. In the Roman/Stoic tradition, the goal 
was to generate the capacity to address future practical problems, where there was no 
assurance that the scientific theory suited to the current context would continue to 
apply.  This in turn involved a particular, analytical, form of history: 
The distinctive nature of the theory of history . . . may be found in its scientific 
temper and emphasis on economic forces as fundamental to historical and 
sociological investigation. The particular feature of this contribution . . . [may 
be] . . . that of finding principles which reduce the apparent chaos of history to 
order and thus enable us to understand our present condition (Skinner, 1965: 
22, emphasis in original). 
Why this historical approach should have been adopted by Post Keynesians will be 
explained further in section 4 in terms of Post Keynesian methodology. 
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A Post Keynesian analysis of historical texts may well differ from other 
readings. This has also been a source of criticism, since this reading is seen to involve 
methodological judgement (while others, by implication, do not). The second set of 
categories we consider here, therefore, is Weintraub’s (1989) distinction between 
‘Methodology’ as a prescriptive exercise and ‘methodology’ as an interpretative 
exercise. Weintraub associates various schools of thought, including Post 
Keynesianism, with employing Methodology with respect to their reading of orthodox 
economics. The implication is that descriptive ‘methodology’ is not only desirable, 
but also feasible. In particular, the argument implies, not only that historians can make 
interpretations without methodological judgement, but also that it is heterodox 
economists like Post Keynesians as a group, as opposed to orthodox economists as a 
group, who fail to be neutral. The most clear exercises in HEA in fact can be found 
rather in orthodox economics.  
In fact, some of the clearest examples of imposing modern concepts on 
interpretation of historical texts can be found in orthodox economics. Arrow and 
Hahn (1971) for example saw themselves as completing Adam Smith’s project of 
formulating a system of market co-ordination, while Lucas (1980) saw himself 
improving on Keynes’s theory of expectations by applying modern techniques. 
Neither gives evidence of having based his efforts on a reading of the original texts, or 
an attempt to understand them purely in terms of the context in which they were 
written.  
But in any case a misleading dual is being put forward, this time between 
description and prescription. It is itself a Methodological judgement that history of 
thought can be divided into IH and HEA, where IH is concerned with historical ‘facts’ 
and the maintenance of ‘standards’ by particular criteria, while HEA is concerned 
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with imposing a prescriptive interpretation on the facts and thus departing from the 
standards of good history. Prescribing IH and proscribing anything else as HEA (as 
diluting ‘standards’) would therefore involve historians of thought themselves in 
engaging in Methodology. Indeed, the advocacy of IH as an account of the facts 
independent of modern concerns, and the reference to ‘standards’, bear an 
uncomfortable relation to positivist Methodology. It is now conventional in the 
methodology literature to accept that any one set of standards is contestable. In 
particular, the Post Keynesian approach to history sets standards just like any other 
approach. 
In fact, within history itself, as much as in the economic historiography 
literature, there is much discussion about interpretive issues (see for example Tully, 
1988). While a historian may strive for the best interpretation, taking on board an 
interpretation of the context and intentions of the author, it is a widely-held view that 
there is generally scope for a range of interpretations to be defended. Similarly in the 
history of economic thought, the science studies literature emphasises the scope for 
different interpretations (see for example Weintraub, 1999). It would seem that a Post 
Keynesian’s interpretation of history of thought could reasonably be understood in 
these terms, just like any other interpretation. 
This is not of course to argue that Post Keynesians are not open to criticism in 
their history of thought, any more than anyone else is. If the criticism is that many 
Post Keynesians do not engage in history of thought in the form of archival research, 
then it is well-taken, but many do so engage. However, if the criticism is that Post 
Keynesians fall on the ‘wrong’ side of an IH/HEA divide, or that Post Keynesian 
efforts at IH suffer from bringing a particular perspective to bear, then that criticism is 
itelf laden with a contestable methodology. Further the idea of one ‘best’ way of 
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doing history of thought seems to entail a puzzling contradiction with the modern 
science studies approach, which allows for a range of focus and thus of interpretation.  
We will return in section 4 to explore further the reasoning behind the Post 
Keynesian approach to history of thought. But first, in the next section, we provide 
some evidence of how Post Keynesians actually use, and contribute to, history of 
thought. 
 
3 History of Thought in Post Keynesian Economics 
3.1   History of Thought and the Father-figures of Post Keynesian Economics 
The two primary father figures of Post Keynesian economics are Keynes and Kalecki. 
There is some dispute as to whether or not neo-Ricardian economics, inspired by 
Sraffa, forms part of Post Keynesianism.v This question is relevant for the current 
discussion since I would argue that the appropriate means of delineating a school of 
thought is methodological, with direct implications for the treatment of history of 
thought. These implications are addressed in section 4 below. But the continuing 
influence from two or three founding fathers whose approaches had significant 
differences reduces the canonical influence of any one of the three; the relations 
between each approach is a matter for periodic debate, involving reference to 
contextual history. 
It is important for considering the use made by the three figures of the history 
of thought in the development and presentation of their economics that they were 
actively engaged also in history of thought, often published separately from their 
theoretical contributions. Keynes’s Essays in Biography is a clear attempt explicitly to 
focus on the context of the writing of such key figures as Malthus, Jevons, Marshall 
and Edgeworth. Further, his interest in original texts and his concern to make sense of 
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them, is evidenced by his discovery with Sraffa of Hume’s (1740) Abstract, and their 
new interpretation of its origins set out in the introduction to the reprinting which they 
organised in 1938. Sraffa similarly has credentials in the history of thought from his 
editorship of the multi-volume Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo (Sraffa, 
ed., 1951), with scholarly introduction. Kalecki also contributed to the history of 
thought, on Marx's reproduction schemas and on Tugan-Baranovsky and Rosa 
Luxemburg (Kalecki, 1990-7, vol. 2), and with a short piece on historical materialism 
and a number of biographical reminiscences (Kalecki, 1990-7, vol. 7). It could be 
argued that each brought his own agenda to what otherwise seems to fit in to the IH 
category (see for example Waterman’s, 1998, discussion of Keynes on Malthus). But 
even those who explicitly aspire to as much objectivity as possible in pursuing IH 
accept that it is impossible, and indeed not necessarily desirable, to avoid bringing 
additional knowledgevi to the exercise (see for example Winch’s, 1998, discussion).  
 In developing their theories, all three presented their work in awareness of the 
history of thought and their place in it; in that sense the separation between history of 
thought and theory development was by no means complete. As well as presenting his 
General Theory in contradistinction to the prevailing theory, Keynes also located it in 
relation to the work, for example, of Say, Malthus, Locke and Hume. At the same 
time, Keynes emphasised the need for theory to fit the context. In the original drafts 
of the General Theory, he presented his monetary theory of production in terms of a 
stages theory of history, with the co-operative economy giving way to the 
entrepreneur economy (see Rotheim, 1981). Keynes’s focus on the history of 
economic thought was thus only one aspect of a more generally historical approach. 
Sraffa too located his theory within IH (see Brewer, this volume). Indeed the three 
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key figures saw historical understanding as part and parcel of their economics, not as 
something separable. 
3.2  History of Thought in Post Keynesian Economics 
While Keynes, Kalecki and Sraffa were not unusual for their time in their awareness 
of, and interest in engaging with, the historical development of economic thought, the 
disciplinary context has changed during the subsequent period in which Post 
Keynesian thought developed. But Post Keynesians retained a strong historical sense, 
in marked contrast with most of orthodox economics.vii Robinson (1979) for example, 
as well as locating her theory historically, displayed an awareness of historiographical 
issues. Eichner (1979) traced the influence from Keynes and Kalecki to later thought. 
Indeed, there have been several attempts to survey Post Keynesian economics, and the 
approach characteristically adopted is to trace Post Keynesian ideas in terms of the 
context of their development (see Hamouda and Harcourt, 1988). King’s (2002) 
forthcoming history of Post Keynesian macroeconomics is an important development, 
as the first comprehensive attempt to present a history, starting with the father figures, 
and then tracing the subsequent development of ideas as history, referring to context 
and authors’ intentions. 
All schools of thought have texts which refer to the development of the 
paradigm. But what is notable about Post Keynesian economics is that this is not 
confined to histories or surveys. It is also evident in the main Post Keynesian texts. 
Davidson (1972, 1994) makes explicit textual reference to the antecedents of Post 
Keynesian thought and specifically the different interpretations of Keynes. Similarly, 
Arestis (1992) and Lavoie (1992) refer extensively to older texts as they trace the 
different developments of ideas which underpin the theoretical structures they build 
up in their texts. These are not ‘histories of thought’. Nevertheless, by relating ideas 
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offered by a range of economists over the twentieth century, and drawing out those 
most relevant to what is seen as important for the present day, they are not simply 
‘using’ history of thought as something taken off the shelf. Nor can this practice be 
classified simply as HEA, as opposed to IH, as in sustaining a canon. While the 
context of the use made of history of thought is modern theoretical development, the 
way in which older works are referred to displays an awareness of the context in 
which they were written, and in turn can be said to contribute to our understanding of 
the texts.viii Indeed many leading Post Keynesians publish history of thought as such, 
alongside work focusing more on modern theoretical development.ix 
The publication of Keynes’s Collected Writings spawned a wide array of 
histories of Keynes’s thought which are more clearly in the IH mould, tracing the 
development of Keynes’s thought and the interrelations between the different pieces 
of work. This has been most notable in terms of Keynes’s philosophy as set out in the 
Treatise on Probability, and its implications for his economics. Inevitably debates 
have occurred over the representation of Keynes’s thought, for example how far there 
was continuity (see Carabelli, 1995) and how far discontinuity (see Bateman, 1987). 
There have been differences of opinion too on the applicability of this historical 
material to modern issues.x 
Perhaps the best work to represent the relationship between Post Keynesian 
economics and the history of thought is Chick (1983). In this book, Chick discusses 
the development of Keynes’s General Theory in his own terms, and in terms of the 
economic and intellectual context in which he wrote, and discusses his 
macroeconomics in relation to modern macroeconomic problems. The very explicit 
attempt to enhance our understanding of Keynes’s work by study of a text in the 
context in which it was written seems to point to IH. But the deliberate attempt to 
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discuss Keynes in relation to modern problems, sometimes to demonstrate his 
relevance, sometimes to point out areas where Keynes’s theory needs to be modified 
or developed along new lines, seems to accord more with history of economic 
analysis. But the exercise is something more than IH or HEA. 
As Chick puts it herself: 
This is not a book in the history of economic doctrine as such, 
which is concerned with illuminating the author’s point of view 
as brightly as possible on his own terms. I hope at several points 
to have done that, though I do not claim that this book reveals 
‘what Keynes really meant’. It is obviously important when 
reading anyone to use one’s sympathy and intuition to 
understand him or her to the best of one’s ability. That effort, and 
basic respect, is necessary even to make effective criticism . . . 
The question of relevance ultimately dominates the book, 
whether evaluating Keynes’s ideas vis-à-vis those of his 
predecessors and their modern representatives or the applicability 
of his ideas to the present (Chick, 1983, vii).   
Another exemplar is the two-volume exercise, organised and edited by 
Harcourt and Riach (1997), attempting to make up for the fact that Keynes never 
wrote the intended second edition of the General Theory. The contributors were asked 
to construct ‘accounts, based on whatever evidence was available and whatever 
speculation seemed reasonable, of what they thought Keynes would have written in, 
say, 1938 or 1939’ (vol. I: xiv) and also to outline developments from Keynes’s own 
thought in the post-war period. This exercise clearly required a detailed understanding 
of Keynes’s thought in the context in which it was developed and published. Indeed, 
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since several contributors chose to write ‘as’ Keynes, an unusual effort was made to 
understand both the intentions and context of Keynes. This part of the exercise was 
then combined with an account of post-war developments in thought inspired by 
Keynes, which required both the capacity to understand the significance of the 
changing context, and the capacity to recognise where Keynes’s theory needed 
modification and further development. This exercise is neither pure IH nor pure HEA. 
Perhaps a particular example from this exercise might serve to explain further 
what is involved. The process of producing the contribution to Harcourt and Riach 
(1997) on endogenous money (Dow, 1997) started from the conventional association 
of Keynes with an exogenous money supply assumption. Yet a more careful reading 
of the General Theory, approached from the perspective of the wider body of 
Keynes’s work on money and banking, of the nature of the banking system at that 
time and of the prevailing contemporary discussion of monetary policy, revealed a 
very different interpretation. This exercise, approached as history, was shown to have 
implications for modern economics, taking account of how the environment has 
changed since the 1930s. In particular, Keynes’s account of how money is generated 
was shown to have included a discussion of the liquidity preference of banks. This 
concept, adjusted in order to apply to a modern banking system, has now contributed 
to the modern debate over the relationship between liquidity preference theory and 
endogenous money theory.  
Having attempted to demonstrate, through a brief account of the literature, the 
Post Keynesian approach to history of thought as integral to economics, we now 
consider further the reasoning behind the approach. 
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4 History of Thought  and Post Keynesian Methodology 
This section explores what it is about Post Keynesian methodology which gives Post 
Keynesian history of thought its particular character.  
The first issue is the very notion of a school of thought. Weintraub (1989) 
draws the distinction between methodology as an interpretive activity (which is 
integrally related to the history of thought) and Methodology as the grounding of 
interpretation in some external principles of theory appraisal. The issue of the role of 
methodology in general in relation to history of thought in general has been widely 
debated (see for example Coats, 2000, and the Backhouse, 1992, and Weintraub, 
1992, exchange). But there is a specific issue when it comes to schools of thought. 
Weintraub identifies schools of thought such as Post Keynesianism, Marxism and 
neo-Austrian economics as engaging in Methodology when they juxtapose their 
theories to those of the mainstream orthodoxy, because they are applying appraisal 
criteria to orthodox economics which are external to that approach. These criteria are 
seen to colour Post Keynesians’ reading of the history of thought.  
Post Keynesians explicitly do not see themselves as offering a critique with 
the aid of some absolutist external Methodology, but rather from the perspective of an 
alternative methodology. It is a preferred alternative, and reasons are given for that 
preference which derive from practice, but there is no claim to demonstrable truth. It 
is a matter of paradigms, where each paradigm develops its own vision of reality. 
Inevitably this vision colours interpretation of text as well as context. But this does 
not preclude Post Keynesians from the interpretation of texts from alternative 
paradigms according to their own, different, visions of reality. Thus for example 
Lawson (1997) aims to clarify neo-classical economics in terms of its context and 
intentions. It could be argued that, nevertheless, he is offering an interpretation from a 
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critical realist perspective. But, because of the social structure of the discipline and 
the social nature of knowledge, any historian of thought has some methodological 
priors which conform more or less closely with some paradigm or another. Indeed, as 
we have seen, the very notion of a sharp divide between IH and HEA is itself 
methodologically laden.  
It was the formation from the 1960s and 1970s of a grouping of Post 
Keynesians around various institutional arrangements which indicated the emergence 
of a distinctive school of thought. It was characteristic, particularly of the early Post 
Keynesian texts, to explain how Post Keynesianism differed from the prevailing 
orthodoxy. This was necessary not least because the methodology of the orthodoxy, 
backed up by whig history of thought, carried the strong implication that the market in 
ideas had already identified the best approach. Starting from Keynes’s own 
expressions of differentiation from the orthodoxy prevailing in his time, these 
markings-out of Post Keynesian territory proceeded with an account of how thought 
had developed since then, with an awareness of changing context. Since the 
differences stemmed from the ontological and epistemological levels, it is not 
surprising that the arguments should be expressed at these levels as well as at the level 
of practice. If practice is embedded in a particular ontology and epistemology, then to 
refer to these levels is not going ‘outside’ practice. This is an insight which owes 
much to the historical study of Keynes’s own theory of knowledge under uncertainty, 
but which also appears in the more general historiography literature (Arouh, 2000). 
While methodological awareness was always evident in Post Keynesian 
economics, the analysis of methodology has increased immeasurably since the 
reissuing of Keynes’s Treatise on Probability in 1973. The reissue provoked an 
extensive study of Keynes’s epistemology, in the context in which he developed it, 
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and seeing how it underpinned his approach to economics, Post Keynesians were able 
to build up a coherent account of their own ontology, epistemology and methodology. 
Recognising the difference in the modern context from that in which Keynes was 
writing, much of this literature considers how best to develop Post Keynesian 
methodology in a modern environment. As Pullen (1998) points out with respect to 
Malthus, so also with Keynes, the carrying forward of ideas to address practical 
modern problems can even be in tune with the original intentions of the author.  
Post Keynesian economics adopts a historical method in the sense that, since 
the purpose of theory is seen as being to inform practical issues, a preference is 
expressed for theory to be designed to fit the context at hand. Since social systems 
(both individual behaviour and institutional structure) evolve, it is quite likely that 
theory will be different for different circumstances. Studying different (historical) 
contexts and the theories developed to address them helps economists to build up the 
judgement necessary for developing theories appropriate to new contexts.  
Theory choice involves trade-offs: Post Keynesians trade off elegance and 
certainty of conclusions against the capacity to mould theory to different realities. By 
focusing on a context rather than an axiomatic structure, Post Keynesians choose to 
employ a range of methods which are not necessarily formally commensurate in order 
to build up some knowledge (with uncertainty reduced as far as possible). It is this 
plurality of method which lends Post Keynesianism its diversity; it is a conscious 
methodological choice, with the choice of methods constrained only by the shared 
ontology of the school of thought.xi  
This epistemology colours the role of the history of thought in Post Keynesian 
economics in a variety of ways. History of thought is no more separable as an activity 
than econometrics, for example. Second, by building up knowledge of past debates, 
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modern economists enhance their understanding of the significance of the Post 
Keynesian line of thought. Third, history of thought plays a constructive part, by 
informing modern economists of the choice of methods and theories made by their 
forebears in different circumstances. The wider the knowledge of other contexts, the 
greater the capacity to develop the art of choosing methods and theories appropriate to 
the problem at hand. 
The epistemological implication is that it is not the purpose of economics to 
identify law-like behaviour to underpin theories for widespread application; some 
theories may suit some contexts well but not others. Theories are indirect knowledge 
held with uncertainty about an economic environment conditioned by the presence of 
uncertainty. Theory does not inevitably progress, but may be identified as taking 
‘wrong turnings’ (from the perspective of a particular paradigm). Judgements may be 
expressed about theories as being more or less suited to a particular context, and good 
reasons presented for these judgements, without any claim to absolute truth.  
From this perspective, the historian of thought is no different from anyone else 
in approaching a body of work from some perspective or other. The best that can be 
done is for that perspective to be made explicit so that their own texts may be read 
accordingly. It need not be the author’s perspective. Thus, for example, Sent’s (1999) 
account of Sargent’s work provided an assessment according to Sargent’s own criteria 
– but there was a range of possible criteria which could have been applied. But there 
is no such thing as pure description. There are numerous debates in the history of 
thought since, no matter how good the intentions of the historian, there is no neutral 
ground from which to survey the scene. Even among contemporaries of the author 
under study there may well be different interpretations according to their differing 
perspectives (see for example Dow, forthcoming, b).  
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Interpretation plays its part in the creation of the reality we study. The 
substantive, epistemological, role of history of thought in Post Keynesian economics 
has been addressed by Chick (1999) in her commentary on Niebyl (1946). In the 
context of the development of classical monetary theory, Niebyl points to the three 
inter-connected levels at which history is important: the history of production, the 
history of institutions and the history of ideas. In the area of monetary theory all three 
can be seen to play an active part in reality: ideas shape institutions which shape 
production which shapes ideas and so on. Thus the thought about which histories are 
written is not simply the end-product of the intentions and context of the author – it 
goes on to affect real economic developments.  
The way in which history of thought is written may influence how economists 
understand reality (see Weintraub, 1991). Further, in a social system, epistemology 
itself can actually change the reality we study. In modern times, for example, the 
thinking behind the Maastricht Treaty has had real consequences for institutions and 
economic developments. Niebyl shows how problems arise when the three levels get 
out of phase – when institutions are introduced to suit a reality which no longer exists, 
for example. Thus, while it is important to consider the genesis of ideas in their 
context, the ideas then take on a life of their own which requires further study. These 
ideas taken out of context, perhaps, by subsequent theorists, still constitute the subject 
matter of the history of thought.  
One substantive implication of the specification of Post Keynesian 
epistemology and methodologyxii is that it serves to define the school of thought. This 
kind of specification is a retrospective exercise, trying to tease out from the relevant 
texts what it is that Post Keynesians have in common. It involves application of new 
knowledge about Keynes’s philosophy, explored particularly in the light of new 
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developments in economic methodology (see Lawson, 1997). While this might seem 
to be a clear indication of HEA rather than IH, it in fact exposes the problematic 
nature of the very concept of ‘modern’ frameworks, as applied to history. It is not just 
that many modern ideas are reinventions of older ideas. But it is further that a new 
framework of ideas can sometimes help us, as historians, to see new facets of well-
thumbed texts. In any case, there is the issue of the origins of the apparently new 
framework. Critical realism, for example, can be shown to have much in common 
with Hume who, while far from being acknowledged as an influence on critical 
realism, nevertheless can be seen to have anticipated much of its implications (Dow, 
forthcoming,a).  
 
5 Conclusion: The Future Role of History of Thought for Post Keynesians 
It might be thought that, once the historical texts have been thoroughly pored over and 
the definitive histories written, Post Keynesians will in the future pay less active 
attention to the history of thought. After all it is a relatively young approach, which 
may now be said to be maturing nicely. Post Keynesianism has gone through the stage 
of differentiation from the orthodoxy in terms of content, and in terms of 
methodology, has had its history documented and could now be said to be free to get 
on with addressing modern issues of theory and policy.  
But the distinctive Post Keynesian approach is such that Post Keynesian 
analysis will continue to be imbued with history. It is not just a matter of locating Post 
Keynesianism in relation to other approaches, but a matter of how knowledge relevant 
to policy issues is constructed. If theory is particular to context, then the more we 
know of different contexts and the theories developed to apply to them, the better able 
we will be to develop theories to apply to new contexts as they emerge.  
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Post Keynesian history of thought is thus something other than what is 
entailed in the dualistic application of the categories of IH/HEA, or 
methodology/Methodology.  It is an attempt to understand the history of ideas in 
terms of the context in which they developed, but with the goal of informing modern 
theory development. Post Keynesian history of thought is not history for its own sake. 
But even history for its own sake cannot escape bringing some perspective to bear on 
interpretation. Indeed the modern historiography literature discourages any notion of 
identifying the one true interpretation of any text. Historians of thought who are not 
Post Keynesians may not accept a Post Keynesian interpretation of a text because of a 
difference in perspective. But that in itself does not rule out Post Keynesian history of 
thought as history – confined to the concepts and concerns of the period of the text. 
Rather it should invite debate and generate further enlightenment for all concerned to 
be aware of readings of texts from a wider range of perspectives. 
The key underlying issue is how far history of thought is separable from 
economics, an issue highlighted by Boettke’s distinction (this volume) between 
producing and consuming history. It seems to be the integration of history of thought 
into Post Keynesian economics which for some is a major source of misgiving. The 
two may indeed be seen as separable from the perspective of different epistemologies; 
history of thought may then be seen as something which can be picked off the shelf. 
But it must be recognised that such an epistemology is, historically, an aberration. The 
norm before the ahistorical formalism which came to dominate in the second half of 
last century was for history of economic thought to be integral to economics.  
But in any case, if history of thought is to be used as input to modern 
economics, the lack of any basis for definitive, externally-validated interpretation 
cannot be ignored. What is picked off the shelf would embody some interpretive 
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perspective or other. The discipline of history is no more immune from differences of 
perspective than economics. Indeed it is important for the basis for different 
interpretations to be brought to the surface, examined and debated. It is particularly 
important for Post Keynesians to have a well-reasoned historical interpretation of 
texts, backed up by a detailed knowledge of the context and intentions of the author, if 
history of thought is to contribute case studies as input to future theoretical 
development. Nor is it reasonable to associate such a view with dilution of standards. 
For Post Keynesians, history of thought is not just an intellectual exercise; it really 
matters for modern economics, and the design of policy and institutions, that history 
of thought is done well. To advocate instead the excising of history from economics, 
and to devolve to others the task of interpretation, is to risk further undermining the 
liberal intellectual project as far as economics is concerned. 
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* I am grateful to Victoria Chick, John King, Anthony Waterman and an anonymous 
referee for comments and suggestions.  
i An excellent history of Post Keynesian (macroeconomic) thought is due to be 
published shortly by Elgar (King, 2002).  Post Keynesian reference to past thought is 
embedded in this account. 
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ii In Lakatosian terms rational reconstruction involves constructing an account of 
theory development according to a set of methodological principles which may or 
may not have been part of the intention of the authors concerned. 
iii This is not to say that the IH/HEA distinction is not useful, if not treated as all-
encompassing duals. Indeed, Gerrard (1991) has argued that much of the confusion in 
the literature interpreting Keynes arises from a lack of clarity as to whether or not 
modern categories and preoccupations are being applied. We will therefore refer to 
the distinction in what follows. 
iv I am indebted to Victoria Chick for this way of putting it. 
v See Harcourt and Hamouda (1988), for an inclusive approach, but see Minsky 
(1990) for an argument that Sraffa is incompatible with Keynes, and Halevi and 
Kriesler (1991) that he is incompatible with Kalecki. Roncaglia (1995), a neo-
Ricardian, has in turn suggested that the Sraffian approach should not be considered 
as part of Post Keynesianism.  
vi The word ‘knowledge’ is used here not to refer to ‘true’ knowledge, but to the 
knowledge carrying greatest weight, in the Keynesian sense of the term. 
vii  Reference to history of thought is also common in other heterodox schools of 
thought, and in other social sciences, such as sociology and political theory. 
viii An example is the new understanding of the precautionary motive for the demand 
for money, which differs from that stated by Keynes in the General Theory. But the 
development of this new understanding has led in turn to a new understanding of 
Keynes’s work (see for example Runde, 1994).  
ix A recent example is Pasinetti’s (2000)  critique of neoclassical theory of growth and 
distribution, which offers a history of the development of ideas in the field. It 
contrasts notably with the companion article by Solow (2000) which provides a 
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somewhat ahistorical account of the neoclassical theory of growth and distribution.  
The fact that Pasinetti’s history is offered under the heading of ‘critique’ may raise 
doubts among some as to its credentials as ‘intellectual history’. Section 3 is designed 
to address this issue. 
x Carabelli (1988) and O’Donnell (1989) explicitly distanced their historical work 
from any direct application to modern economic issues, unlike Lawson (1995) and 
Gerrard (1995).  
xi Other heterodox schools of thought also tend to adopt pluralism of method. But 
because each school is defined by its ontology, the range of methods employed differs 
from school to school. 
xii See Dow (1998, 2001) for fuller expositions. 
